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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(4) (2001), which grants the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases
transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal from a Modified Judgment
and Minute Entry of the Third Judicial District Court. The Utah Supreme Court had
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001). The
Supreme Court transferred the case to this court on October 19, 2001.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this brief:
1.

Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant Doms' Motion to Amend

Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59 U.R.C.P. alleging that the Court failed and refused to grant
Appellant Doms all amounts paid under the Trust Deed Note when the Court ordered
rescission of the contract in this matter?
2.

Did the Trial Court err by failing to implement the Final Decision of the

Utah Court of Appeals in this matter dated June 24, 1999?
3.

The standard on appeal for each of these cases is the legal error standard,

pursuant to Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
("Pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues . . . become the law of the case
and must be followed in subsequent proceedings; . . . (thus) the lower court must
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate
court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces").
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND RULES
Any determinative constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are set forth in the
addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a Final Judgment (Add. 1 and 2) of the Third Judicial District
Court, Summit County, State of Utah. The statement of the case is more specifically
spelled out in the following Statement of Facts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A concise statement of facts material to consideration of the questions presented is
as follows:
a.

In March 1982, Appellees Dan and Jeanie Scott, Ellen Anderson and

D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson's now deceased husband, sold a parcel of property
known as Rossi Hills (the Property) in Park City, Utah to Doms and Michael R. McCoy
for residential development. (R. at 6744, F. of F. 17.)
b.

In connection with this sale, Appellees executed a Warranty Deed

that included a covenant against encumbrances. (R. at 6743-44, F. of F. 1, 4.) Doms and
McCoy executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to secure payment of the balance
owed on the purchase price of $194,250.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 19, 20.)
c.

McCoy no longer has any interest in the property and is not involved

in this appeal. (R. at 7185-86)
3

d.

The purchase price for the Rossi Hills property was the amount of

$276,750.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 17.)
e.

The Appellees received the sum of $10,000.00 as earnest money in

the aforementioned transaction, and a down payment of $72,500.00, leaving a balance
due on the purchase price of $194,250.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 18.)
f.

The Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $194,250.00

executed by Doms and McCoy called for monthly interest payments of $2,266.25 up to
and including January 10, 1985. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 19, 20.)
g.

All of these monthly payments were received by Appellees, in the

total amount of $72,520.00. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 22.)
h.

The entire unpaid balance of $194,250.00, together with interest,

was due on January 25, 1985. (R. at 6747, F. of F. 19.)
i.

In late 1984 or early 1985, Doms' attorney informed him that several

encroachments and easements existed on the property. (R. at 7504-05.) As a result,
Doms did not make the scheduled balloon payment on the property on January 25, 1985,
and attempted to deed the property back to Appellees in return for cancellation of the
Trust Deed Note. (R. at 7512-14.)
j.

Appellees did not respond to this offer and, in June 1985, filed a

complaint seeking to foreclose on the property. (R. at 1.) Two years later, Appellees
obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy because they failed to file an
answer in response to the Appellees' Complaint. (R. at 34-40.)
4

k.

Nine days after entry of the default judgment, Doms filed an Answer

and Counterclaim to Appellees' Complaint. (R. at 41-44.) Approximately four months
later, the trial court entered an Order setting aside the default judgment against Doms on
the condition that Doms pay all attorney's fees incurred by Appellees in obtaining the
default judgment. (R. at 76-78.) However, the court reserved a final ruling on the award
of these fees until final disposition of the case on the merits. (R. at 245-47.)
1.

In May 1987, the property wras sold to Summit County in a

foreclosure sale for the non-payment of property taxes. (R. at 3115.) At that time, title to
the property was held by Domcoy, a corporation formed by Doms and McCoy, to which
they had transferred their interest in the property. (R. at 7182-84.)
m.

After Doms paid all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs,

Summit County conveyed the property to Domcoy by quit claim deed. (R. at 3116-17;
3160-61.) Domcoy then conveyed the property to Doms. (R. at 3117.)
n.

On remand, the trial court found that the conveyance of the property

from Summit County to Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms holding "clear title to
the property." (R. at 6692.)
o.

In the meantime, Appellees had filed a separate action (Civil No.

10066 consolidated with the instant action, Civil No. 8339) challenging the tax sale and
subsequent purchase of the property by Summit County, seeking to quiet title to the
property in their favor. Upon stipulation of Summit County, Plaintiffs and Doms, the
trial court set aside the tax sale, and the tax sale was found to have no effect whatsoever
5

on the ultimate outcome of this case. Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ^[12, 984
P.2d392(Add. 3).
p.

In July 1988, Doms had amended his Counterclaim, seeking

rescission of the contract or, in the alternative, damages for breach of implied covenants,
breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. (R. at 237-42.)
q.

The trial was bifurcated and a three day trial was held on April 17-

19, 1990 on the issue of rescission of the contract. (R. at 4188-95.) Appellees argued, on
the basis of laches, that Doms was prohibited from rescinding the contract because there
was an unreasonable delay between the time Doms learned of the basis for rescission and
his attempt to rescind the contract. (R. at 4191.) The trial court subsequently issued a
Memorandum Decision, finding that because Doms unreasonably delayed seeking
rescission, laches barred rescission of the contract. (R. at 4194.)
r.

The remainder of the trial was held on August 21-24, 1990 and

focused on the issue of whether Doms was entitled to damages as a result of the
encumbrances on the property. (R. at 7753-8285.) The trial court later held a hearing on
the issue of attorney's fees. (R. at 6360-6540.) In its Second Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Judgment, the trial court, based upon
laches, denied Doms' request for rescission and awarded Doms $83,000.00 in damages as
a result of the encumbrances on the property and $101.50 in costs. (R. at 6874-6906.)
The trial court also awarded $41,333.20 in attorney's fees and costs, plus interest to
Appellees. (R. at 6898.)
6

s.

Both parties appealed the trial court's decision on several grounds.

The Utah Court of Appeals subsequently issued an unpublished Memorandum Decision
holding that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of laches to bar rescission of
the contract without first entering Findings of Fact regarding whether Appellees were
prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission. Anderson v. Doms, No. 920653-CA,
slip op. at 2-3 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) (unpublished memorandum decision).
t.

Consequently, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case to the

trial court for further findings on the issue of prejudice, stating, "If the trial court cannot
find from the evidence presented that the [plaintiffs] were prejudiced by the delay, the
equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." Id.
u.

On remand, the trial court again refused to rescind the contract,

concluding Appellees were prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission. A new
appeal followed: Anderson, et al v. Doms, et al, 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 (Add.
3).
v.

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court

and drew the following conclusions:
i.

"Although Doms failed to make payments required by the

Trust Deed Note, he was excused from doing so as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the
covenant against encumbrances." Id. at ^f 17.
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ii.

"Any prejudice that resulted from Doms' failure to make

payments pursuant to the Trust Deed Note was precipitated by Plaintiffs' breach of
warranty." Id.
iii.

"The only theory Plaintiffs advance on appeal to bar

rescission of the contract is laches. This theory fails, however, because Plaintiffs have
not shown any prejudice. Therefore, Doms is entitled to rescind the contract as a remedy
for breach of warranty." Id. at If 19.
iv.

"On remand, the trial court should determine what is

necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the
contract. See Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984)(affirming rescission
of contract and placing parties in original positions by allowing recovery of payments
already made under contract). In fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the
rule is equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of the parties. How this
is to be accomplished, or indeed whether it can, is a matter which is within the discretion
of the trial court under the facts as found to exist by the trier of fact. The trial court
therefore has discretion to fashion an adequate and reasonable remedy so that an
aggrieved party is adequately compensated for its loss, so long as that remedy is not
duplicative (citing cases)." Id.
v.

"In this case, Doms apparently made no improvements or

changes to the property such that the parties could not be returned to their respective
positions prior to entering into the contract. We therefore remand this issue to the trial
8

court for a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental
value plus interest. Id. at 1125.
vi.

"Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the

original buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy and Domcoy."
Doms, 1999 UT App 207, f21, n.12, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 3).
vii.

"Both parties appeal from the trial court's award of attorneys

fees and costs. . . . Although Doms requests fees for pursuing his rescission remedy . . .
he is not entitled to fees and costs incurred in conjunction with breach of the covenant
against encumbrances. . . . We therefore do not award any attorneys fees to Doms." Id
at 1J22.
viii.

"Regarding the trial court's award of fees and costs to

Plaintiffs, we affirm the trial court's award of fees and costs incurred in obtaining the
default judgment (citing cases). . . . However, because Plaintiffs are not the prevailing
party, we vacate all other awards to Plaintiffs." Id. at ^[23.
ix.

"Thus, we remand to the trial court for consideration of

Plaintiffs' counsel's evidence regarding reasonable fees incurred in connection with
obtaining the default judgment and an appropriate award based on that evidence." Id
x.

" . . . rescission of the contract in this case is consistent with

Utah case law. Accordingly, the trial court should order rescission and determine an
appropriate remedy in connection with rescinding the contract. . . . We also affirm the
trial court's fee award to Plaintiffs incurred in connection with obtaining the default
9

judgment but vacate all other attorney fee awards to Plaintiffs . . . Reversed and
remanded." Id at 1f24.
w.

Appellees petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing, but in

an Order dated August 18, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for Rehearing.
x.

On January 27, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court denied the Petition

for Certiorari filed by Appellees in this matter. (R. at 8582-83.)
y.

On January 31, 2000, the Remittitur was issued from the Utah Court

of Appeals to the trial court to implement the Opinion issued by the Utah Court of
Appeals on June 24, 1999. (R. at 8584-95.)
z.

The District Court, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, heard

the argument of counsel regarding Appellant Doms' "Motion to Enter Judgment on the
June 24, 1999 Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals" on June 29, 2000. (R. at 883334.) An oral ruling was issued by the Court at that time. (R. at 8833-34.)
aa.

Appellant Doms filed his Motion to Amend Judgment pursuant to

Rule 59 U.R.C.P. on or about July 27, 2000. (R. at 8848-51.)
bb.

Appellees filed a "Motion to Expand or Broaden the Proposed

Modified Judgment in Order to Properly Comply with the Order of the Court of Appeals"
on or about September 28, 2000. (R. at 8898-8906.)
cc.

The Court entered its Modified Judgment (Add. 1) and Minute Entry

(Add. 2) on or about July 7, 2001 denying both Appellant's and Appellees' Motions. (R.
at 8948-52.)
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dd.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on or about August 1, 2001.

(R. at 8956-58.)
ee.

A Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by Appellees on August 10,

2001. (R. at 8972-74.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is Appellant's position that this case can be quickly and easily disposed of by
this Court. The Utah Court of Appeals (hereafter "this Court") clearly held in Anderson
v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ^[19, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 3), that rescission is an appropriate
remedy in this case, and because of that fact, the trial court should have restored the
parties to their original positions prior to the contract entered into in March of 1982. In
order to restore the parties to their positions prior to the contract, Defendant Doms should
be required to provide a Quit-Claim Deed restoring title to the property to Plaintiffs and
Plaintiffs should have been required to refund all monies paid on the contract, including
interest payments paid, plus interest. Doms should also be entitled to all taxes paid on
the property during the period of time he was in possession of it.
In its Modified Judgment dated July 7, 2001, the trial court did indeed award
Doms $10,000.00 earnest money at 10% simple interest from the date of payment which
had been paid on the contract, the sum of $72,500.00 at 10% simple interest which
constituted the down payment on the contract, and all payments made for taxes on the
property at 10% interest. However, the trial court chose not to award Doms monthly
interest payments made on the contract payments which totaled $72,520.00. Although
11

the trial court opined that had the money been borrowed from any other party Defendant
Doms would have had to repay it, Defendant Doms argues that the interest payments
made on a monthly basis on the contract (which totaled $72,520.00) were part of the
contract requirements.
The mere fact that the contract called for a balloon payment with monthly interest
payments being made should not alter the trial court's requirement to restore the parties to
their original positions prior to the contract being entered into as ordered by this Court in
its June 24, 1999 decision. This Court expressly ordered the repayment of interest
payments when it stated that it was instructing the trial court to "determine what is
necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the
contract... we therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a determination and
award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest paid." See
Doms, 1999 UT App 207, pO, 984 P.2d 392 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to comply with the specific instructions
of this Court that Doms was to be awarded "net payments paid by him less rental value
plus interest paid." Id. This Court should therefore reverse and vacate the Modified
Judgment and remand it to the trial court with an Order requiring it to enter Judgment to
Defendant Doms for all amounts paid on the contract, including the $72,520.00 paid in
monthly payments which constituted interest on the Trust Deed Note prior to the
triggering of the balloon payment coming due plus 10% simple prejudgment interest and
postjudgment interest on all amounts after a final judgment is entered. This Court should
12

affirm all other components of the Modified Judgment to be part of a new final judgment
to be entered by the trial court upon remand.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IMPLEMENT THE
FINAL DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DATED
JUNE 24, 1999 IN THIS CASE.
This is the Third Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals regarding this case which
was actually begun in 1985 by the filing of Plaintiffs' (Appellees) Complaint. While it
was hoped by Defendant (Appellant) Doms that the June 24, 1999 decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals (i.e. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 (Add. 1)) would have been
the last necessary appeal in this case, the trial court failed to implement the decision and
clear mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals upon remand, necessitating this Third
Appeal.
In the Second Appeal, the Court of Appeals clearly held that on remand, the trial
court should determine what is necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the
time the parties entered into the contract. See id. at f20. The Court of Appeals also
stated:
In fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the rule is
equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of
the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed
whether it can, is a matter which is within the discretion of
the trial court under the facts as found to exist by the trier of
fact. The trial court therefore has discretion to fashion an
adequate and reasonable remedy so that an aggrieved party is
13

adequately compensated for its loss, so long as that remedy is
not duplicative.
Id
The Court of Appeals went on to say:
In this case, Doms apparently made no improvements or
changes to the property such that the parties could not be
returned to their respective positions prior to entering into the
contract. We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for
a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid
by him less rental value plus interest. Doms is entitled to a
refund of monies paid as one of the original buyers of the
property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy and
Domcoy.
Id at |20, n. 12.
It was the position of Defendant (Appellant) Doms before the trial court that he
should have been awarded all amounts paid to Plaintiffs (Appellees) pursuant to the
contract, with interest from the date each payment was made until date of judgment at the
prejudgment rate, and thereafter at the post-judgment rate until paid. (R. at 8612.)
Defendant Doms also claimed that he should have been awarded all taxes paid on the
subject property up to and including the date of actual rescission to be ordered by the
lower court with interest from the date each tax payment was made until paid. (R. at
8612.) Doms argued that he should have been awarded the following amounts:
1.

$10,000.00 paid as earnest money at 10% interest from the date of

payment;
2.

$72,500.00 constituting the down payment at 10% interest;

14

3.

Interest payments made on the Trust Deed Note at 10% interest from the

date each payment was made, as follows:
a.

Payment made April 21, 1982 of $2266.25;

b.

Payment made May 24, 1982 of $2266.25;

c.

Payment made June 14, 1982 of $2266.25;

d.

Payment made July 16, 1982 of $2266.25;

e.

Payment made August 25, 1982 of $2266.25;

f

Payment made October 8, 1982 of $4,532.50;

g.

Payment made December 22, 1982 of $4,532.50;

h.

Payment made December 22, 1982 of $2,266.25;

i.

Payment made March 8, 1983 of $2266.25;

j.

Payment made April 27, 1983 of $4532.50;

k.

Payment made July 8, 1983 of $4532.50;

1.

Payment made August 16, 1983 of $4532.50;

m.

Payment made October 24, 1983 of $4532.50;

n.

Payment made December 15, 1983 of $4532.50;

o.

Payment made January 26, 1984 of $2266.25;

p.

Payment made April 16, 1984 of $6798.75;

q.

Payment made June 21, 1984 of $4532.50;.

r.

Payment made July 18, 1984 of $2266.25;

s.

Payment made August 15, 1984 of $2266.25;
15

t.

Payment made October 1, 1984 of $2266.25;

u.

Payment made December 31, 1984 of $4532.50.

(R. at 8614-17.)
Defendant Doms also argued he was entitled to a refund of all taxes paid on the
property with interest and presented an exhibit to the trial court that showed the amount
of taxes to that date. (R. at 8612.) Defendant Doms agreed that the property should be
rescinded by his issuing a Quit-Claim Deed back to Plaintiffs.
However, the trial court chose only to award the $10,000.00 earnest money, the
$72,500.00 down payment, and the taxes paid, but refused to award the interest payments
made pursuant to the Trust Deed Note. (R. at 8950-51.) The court's refusal to award
these interest payments on the contracts amounts to $72,520.00 in payments plus interest,
which itself, at a rate often percent (10%) over a period of twenty years (the approximate
time this money has been in Plaintiffs' possession), totals well over $400,000.00. The
trial court's presumptuous and selective reading of this Court's mandate is clearly
contrary to the law of the case and contrary to the law in general. See the Court's
Modified Judgment (Add. 1).
In remanding this case to the lower court for judgment, the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals specifically stated:
"We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a determination and
award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus
interest." Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ^21, 984 P.2d 392 (Add
3.).
16

The Court went on in footnote 12 on page 398 to state "Doms is entitled to a refund of
monies paid as one of the original buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest
to McCoy and Domcoy." Id. at ^[21, n.12.
It seems very clear that the law of the case is that Defendant Doms should be
entitled to all monies paid on this contract. The Utah Court of Appeals does not make an
exception for interest paid, and therefore the Court's refusal to award the $72,520.00 in
payments plus interest is contrary to the law of the case {see Point II infra).
The purpose of rescission and restitution1 is to return the parties to the status quo
and to recover the payments made on the contract. "Payments", in context of a land sale,
are not limited to earnest money payments but, rather, refer to any benefit the purchaser
conferred to the seller.
The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties to the status quo to
the extent possible, Horton v. Horton, 659 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984), or as
demanded by the equities in the case, Forsythe v. Elkins, 216 Mont. 108,
700 P.2d 596 (1985). In the case of a rescission, the plaintiffs are entitled
to be returned to the status quo and to recover the payments made on the
contract less the fair rental value of the premises for the time they had
possession thereof. Farmer v. Groves, 276 Or. 563, 555 P.2d 1252 (1976);
see also Matannska Valley Bank v. Abernathy, 445 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1968);
Benzer v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976).

1

The terms restitution and rescission are frequently used together, sometimes as if
they were synonymous. Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman, the Law of Property, §
10.7 (1984). This memorandum will also use the terms synonymously.
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Diigan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (affirming trial court's
award to purchaser of amounts purchaser paid for real property, including monthly
mortgage payments.)
In the case of a seller's breach of a land purchase contract, it is well settled law
that rescission requires the seller to return all monies paid by the purchaser (hence, all
monies received by the seller), plus interest on those monies, minus a sum representing
the fair rental value, if one exists. See, e.g. Brener-Harris on, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d
716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(affirming return of all money paid by the purchaser, including
interest-only payments, in case of rescission); Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah
1984) (affirming award of all amounts paid by purchaser to seller, less rental value, as
appropriate remedy for rescission); Lee v. Yang, 987 P.2d 519 (Or. App. 1999) (vendor
must return all of purchaser's payments where rescission is awarded in a contract for the
sale of property); Robison v. Katz, 610 P.2d 201 (N.M. App. 1980) (purchaser entitled to
return of all consideration paid for land, with interest, in case of rescission of land sales
contract); Farmer v. Groves, 555 P.2d 1252 (1976) (purchasers entitled to be returned to
status quo and to recover payments made on contract in rescission of land sales contract);
Lyerla v. Watts, 482 P.2d 318 (Nev. 1971) (in case of rescission, purchaser entitled to
restitution of amount paid on purchase price under contract of sale); Matanuska Valley
Bank v. Abernathy, 445 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1968) (upon rescission of land sales agreement,
purchaser entitled to return of money paid on purchase price, including interest and any
amount expended in payment of taxes, plus interest, in addition to other remedies); Millor
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v. Remior, 383 P.2d 596 (Idaho 1963) (purchaser entitled to all purchase money paid
together with interest thereon from time of payment.) Thus, it is a required component of
the law of rescission that rescission, in the context of a land purchase contract, demands
return of all money paid to the seller, including interest-only payments.
This required component of rescission comes from the very meaning and purpose
of rescission. Rescission "suggests the returning, by a party to a contract, of the
performance he or she has received from the other party." Cunningham, Stoebuck and
Whitman, The Law of Property, § 10.7 (1984), citing 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1102 (1964).
Rescission "refers to a judicial order compelling the defendant to return to the plaintiff
the value of the performance he or she has rendered, thus returning the plaintiff to the
position he had before the contract was formed." Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman,
the Law of Property, § 10.7 (1984), citing 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1112 (1964). "For
example, if the purchaser under a land sale contract declares it rescinded because the
vendor refuses to convey title as agreed, the purchaser may well seek not only his earnest
money and other payments made but also a judgment for loss-of-bargain damages."
Cunningham, Stoebuck and Whitman, The Law of Property, § 10.7 (1984) (emphasis
added.) Other treatises explaining the purpose of rescission concur. See e.g. Restatement
of the Law, Second, Contracts § 370 Comment (a) and § 371, Comment (a) (1981)
(emphasis added.):
A party's restitution interest is his interest in having restored to him any
benefit available that he has conferred on the other party. . . . The
requirement of this section is generally satisfied if a benefit has been
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conferred, and it is immaterial that it was later lost, destroyed, or
squandered. A party who is liable m restitution for a sum. of money must
pay an amount equal to the benefit that has been conferred upon him. If the
benefit consists simply of a sum of money received by the party from whom
restitution is sought, there is no difficulty in determining this amount."
Furtheniioie, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that where there is
rescission of an agreement involving real property, "the buyers are entitled to be returned
to the status quo and to recover the payments made on the contract, ics^ U\*. I;U. .-CVA.
\ all le of 1:l:i e prei n ises

" Ditgi v ? i , ' 01 le s, 724 I} 2d 955 957 (I Jtah 1986)(emphasis

added). These payments constitute "lost profit or other related consequential damages,"
and "include expenses resulting from fraud, loss of good vv ill, any expenditures in
mitigatioi i of dan lages, lost ear rungs, prejudgment .interest; and i.j.o ,>i fairest on loans
required to finance the business." ONG Int'l (USA) Ind, i. . / ' Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d
447, 457 (Utah 1993)(relying on Dan B Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 9.2,
at 5v.v

;

,i '

i emphasis ii i IL ^>

Althouu- me Utah Cuuit ui \ppeals did not mention this part of the decision in
ONG Int'l in its own ruling i n Anderson ^ >. Dorm (1999 I JT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 (Add.
3.)), it did cite to ON G Int'l and it did specifically hold tl: iat inter est si lould be a w ai ded on
rema i id Sh tee O NG h it'I states that both ty pes of interest are available as a remedy, a rid
since under the law of the case doctrine the appellate decision must be strictly followed,
the trial coin t clearly erred in failing to award the mterest on the contract carried by the
sellers, ai id th/i is paid of necessity ai id by agreement to finance the contract i intil the
balloon payment was due.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IS BOUND BY THE LAW OF THE CASE.
The trial court's opinion that "had the money been borrowed from any other party,
Defendant Doms would have had to repay it... (t)he Court cannot see a legal basis for
allowing this interest on the trust deed note to be returned to Defendant Doms and so the
interest payments shall not be recovered by Doms" is a position directly contrary to the
law of rescission and the law of the case as mandated by this Court and is clearly
erroneous. (R. at 8950-51.) Neither Plaintiffs' counsel nor the court cited any authority
for this proposition, and this conclusion made by the Judge in paragraph 4 of the
Modified Judgment is clearly contrary to the law of the case and case law and authority
generally on the subject. The Judge's reasoning is flawed because if the money had been
borrowed from a third party and paid on this contract, sellers would have still been
responsible to Doms for a return of those payments upon rescission.
The law of the case doctrine is something that has been clearly established at Utah
law and civil law in general for hundreds of years. Perhaps the best and most recent
analysis of the law of the case doctrine appears in the Utah Supreme Court case of Gildea
v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75, %9, 31 P.3d 543, as follows:
"Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal
bind the trial court on remand, and generally bind this court should the case
return on appeal after remand. See, e.g. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892
P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995); Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah
1990); see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 849 (1993). The doctrine was
developed to promote the obedience of inferior courts as well as 'to avoid
the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and
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reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same case.'
Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037. The effect of abandoning the doctrine in the
context of a post-remand appeal to the appellate court would not be
inconsequential, because considerable inefficiencies would result if parties
were free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier ruling of this
court. The doctrine, however, is not applied inflexibly. Id. at 1038; see
also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 149(b) (1990). Indeed, this court need not apply the
doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense of the greater interest in
preventing unjust results or unwise precedent. Thurston, 892 P.2d at I ^39.
Accordingly, the doctrine will generally not be enforced under the
following exceptional circumstances:
(1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling
authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3)
when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
Id.; see also 18 Charles Allen Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4478, at 790 (1981). Therefore, although the doctrine is not an
inexorable command that rigidly binds a court to its former decisio
waived only for the most cogent of reasons."
Thus, the only inquiry to be considered by this Court in reviewing the trial ion- -"s
refusal to award the mterest payments made on flu *eal estate contract as outline n
Poii it 1. supf t i", is the 1:1 i i ee pi onged inqi ii- •

-

•..-.;,•',/

. ' - .-^

•••*.•!.

been no intervening change of controlling authority; there is no claiin that new evidence
has become available; and there is no reason the Court shotild be convi need that its prior
decisioi I was cleai \y ei roneoi is a nd t;,v oi lid ' v orl : a ma n ifest in ji istice Indeed 1:1: i 2 on h «
manifest injustice or clear error on display m this case belongs to the trial court, winch
inexplicably refused to follow the mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals to "restore the
par ties to the stati is qi 10 at the time the pa 1 ties entei ed i nto the contract" ( Ande * ; son \
Doms, 1.999 UT App 207,If 20, 984 P.2d 392) and inexcusably failed to.allow Doms "a
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refund of monies paid as one of the original buyers of the property, and as the successor
in interest to McCoy and Domcoy" (Id. at ^[21, n. 12).
Not only is there no reason for this Court to depart from the doctrine of the law of
the case, but there is every reason in the world for this Court to find that the trial court's
refusal to follow the mandate from the Utah Court of Appeals was clearly erroneous and
worked a manifest injustice upon Defendant Doms.
CONCLUSION
The Complaint in this case was originally filed by Appellees in 1985. The case
has been up to the Utah Court of Appeals on four occasions (on one prior occasion it was
remanded as being premature and not ripe for appeal) and up to the Utah Supreme Court
three times on one Petition for Interlocutory Relief and two separate Petitions for
Certiorari. This appeal, as stated previously, constitutes the third substantive appeal in
the case. It is time for this Court to end this seventeen year plus case and issue a mandate
back to the district court ordering it to award Doms the $72,520.00 in interest payments
plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the appropriate legal rates, and to order the
trial court to continue to implement as part of that final judgment all other provisions of
its Order, including the determination that the property in question had no fair rental
value and that Appellees had failed to provide any evidence of such.
Only by this direct mandate to the lower court requiring the specific components
of the judgment necessaiy can this Court rest reasonably assured that no further appeals
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will be taken in this case, and that the case will finally end. The interests of justice so
dictate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
DATED this *J_ day of

rflA*fe

, 2002.
COHNF P \PPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

eta-?-"LARRY KA KELLER
Attorney lor Defendant/Appellant

CERUHl A IE UF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct cupv of the foregoing to be mailed,
by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this \0* day of ~pA*r<L
, 2002, to:
Irving H. Biele, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1235 East 2nd South, #301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Larry A. Kirkham
Attorney at Law
871 East 9400 South
Sandy, Utah 84094

(g.yii
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, r'.t.
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo—
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
MODIFIED JUDGMENT
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
:
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,
:
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Defendants.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal,
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and JEANNE SCOTT,

:
:

Civil N n 8 11' >
:

Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

:

07/09/01

ION 10:25 FA.

1^3 003

ELLEN AN DERSON, as Personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON; D A N SCOTT; and
PAUL 1 ") W A W Trustee,

:•

Plaintiffs,
V

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate

Civil. IN

and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC , a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5,

\ »< Jfco

:
:
:

Defendants.
ooOooThe above-entitled matter came before the Court on June 29, 2000 on Defendant Doms'
Motion to Enter Judgment on the June 24, 1999 Decision of the ( It; ill C< :« u t of A { >pe ; ds with Ii < ring
H, Biele, Esq. present and representing Plaintiffs and Larry R. Keller, Esq. present and representing
Defendant Eugene E. Doras.
This Court finds and determines that despite the efforts on the part of Plaintiffs to continue to
argue matters conclusively decided Si \ the Ji me M, 199S* I )«< e,mn <il (he I I Lull * .ui.it ol A41pe.il ,, ,uid
upheld by the J eih Supreme O m i t when it denied Certiorari in this matter, Judgment according to
t h e i > ; .eeiOH

n
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•
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•
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•
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0 7 / 0 9 / 01
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1.

Recission as ordered by the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy in this matter,

2.

Defendant Eugene R D o m s has been determined by lln" 1 H.di l Vnui n| Appeals h' bu
fully entitled to all amounts paid under the contract upon its recission, and this Court
declines to rule differently than the Utah Cou. - . ,» .v* •
Court found Doms to be entitled to a refund of monies paid <u; one ot the nj.- nal
buyers of the property, and as tlie siiccessor in interest r \ ;. • •

3.

,• = .

Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all i ight, title and interest to the property subject
to his receiving the following sums:
a.

$10,000,00 earnest money at 10% interest from the date of payment which
shall be the sum. of $28,731.5] through August 1, 2000 and $2. i 4 pei i I; ij
thereafter;

b.

The sum of $72,500.00 constituting the down payment at 10% simple interest
which shall be the sum of $205,959.59 through August 1, 2000 and $19.86
per day thereafter;

c.

All payments made for taxes on the property at 10% interest from the date the
payment was made which shall be the ^um ot $2J,< * ,J • ' »J through Amy. n I,
2000 and $4.26 per day thereafter.

4.

Payments made pursuant to the Trust Deed Note which were interest payments shall
not be recoverable by Defendant Doms It is the Court's opinion that had the money
been borrowed from any other party, Defendant Doms would have h : ' . ? - ; •

;•..

The Court cannot see a legal basis for allowing this interest on the Trust Deed Note
3

07/09/0J

1^1005

MON 1 0 : 2 6 FA 7

to be returned to Defendant Doms and so the interest payments shall not be recovered
>.

5.

he i'\)urt of Appeals has directed this Court to reduce the Judgment by fair rental
'<*

we v ei the Coi u 1: fi i: ids 1 1 i at tl vei ecoi (lis completely devoid of ai 13 ba sis for

rental value for this raw ground which had never been used in any way by Defendant
Doms. Therefore the Cpur t: declines to reduce the Judgment in this case by any rental
value, finding there is no fair rental value to be placed upon, the p.r operty.
6.

I he Court chooses not to revisit the attorney's fees issue as such fees were necessary
to set aside the Default Judgment in 'this case; therefore no award is made for
recovery of said attorney's fees by Defendant Doms.

7.

This Courtfindsthat there has been an unwillingness on thejgaxLofPkkttifl^
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and^kfaSugh the Court does not believe that
ftlaintiffs7 counsel has intenjieiially attempted to mislead it th ere el earlj ha s bt t i i a
breach of R u k ^ w i t h regard to arguments made by counsel and the sum of $500.00

|

*

#

jg*s^arded as attorney's fees to Defendant Doi ns.
8.

All amounts awarded here shall bear judgment at the legal post judgment interest rate
from the date this Judgment is entered.

4

07/09/01

@006

MON 10:26 FAJ

A

DATED this / ^ d a y of
BYTHECOURT:

KQBEjnr H1LDER
District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, et al,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY, et al,
Defendants.

Civil No. 850698339
Judge Robert K. Hilder

This matter is before the court for decision of numerous pending motions, all connected
with this court's bench Ruling of June 29, 2000. To the court's surprise and constemation,ybwr
Notices to Submit have been filed. The court cannot fully explain the course of events that has
created this unprecedented (for this court) circumstance, but until receipt of Mr. Keller's June 26,
2001, letter, on July 5, 2001, the court was completely unaware of the last three Notices.
As noted, the matter was argued and decided on June 29, 2000. Thereafter, a proposed
judgment was submitted and the file placed on the judge's desk, Mr. Biele then contacted the
court and indicated that he would be traveling, and he requested a modest extension to file
additional pleadings. Because the judge was about to leave the country for almost two weeks,
Mr. Biele was advised that the matter would not be decided immediately in any event The file
was set aside in the judge's Coalville office. Over the next couple of months, numerous
additional pleadings were filed, but the judge never saw another Notice to Submit, and in time
the case was overlooked in the press of other matters. The judge should have realized the case
was languishing, but he did not, and the court now offers its sincere apologies to all parties and
both counsel for the unconscionable delay.
For ease of reference only, the court"will refer to the parties as Anderson and Doms. The
matters before the court are numerous, but related. Doms' proposed Judgment was resubmitted
in a modified form to address Anderson's Objection to certain interest calculations. The court
finds the Objection was correct in principle, and the modification resolved the problem.
Accordingly, the court has this date signed the Modified Judgment as proposed, except that the
court has deleted paragraph 7 for the reasons stated below.
Doms has also moved, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend that
portion of the judgment that denies repayment of Doms1 interest payment on the loan from
plaintiffs. For the reasons stated at the hearing, and generally in accord with the "dual capacity"

37/09/01

1^003

MON 09:09 FAX

reasoning articulated in Anderson's opposition to the Motion, the court denies the Motion and
affirms its prior decision, which is now set forth in the signed Modified Judgment
Anderson has filed several motions which all, in essence, ask the court to change its
ruling. They include a Motion to Correct, Modify, or Reconsider, a Motion to Expand or
Broaden the Proposed Judgment, and a "Corrected" Motion to Expand, etc. They are ail either
motions to amend or reconsider. A centerpiece of all is the continued assertion that there is no
basis to find that Doms is successor-in-interest to McCoy and DomCoy A second part of each
Motion is a request that the court reconsider its imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, in the form of an
award of $500 attorney's fees.
The court shares Doms' counsel's inability to understand why Mr. Bieie continues to
urge a position that seems so completely at odds with the law of the case so bluntly stated by the
Utah Court of Appeals, but ironically, his continued assertions cause this court to question its
basis for imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Biele seems to sincerely believe that (1) there is no
factual basis for the successor-in-interest conclusion and, (2) even if that is the law of the case,
the charge to this court is to restore Doms to his position before the events underlying this case
occurred, and that position does not include any consideration of the position of the parties to
whose interests he succeeded. While this court does not believe it has any such latitude, and that
Doms is now, for all intents and purposes, McCoy and DomCoy, the court cannot find the
repeated and unavailing argument was urged maliciously or in bad faith. Accordingly, the Rule
11 finding is vacated.
The court specifically instructs Mr. Biele, however, that he is not to raise the successorin-interest argument at the trial court level again, unless he has successfully argued the matter on
some subsequent appeal and the terms of remand specifically permit such argument. Any
violation of this instruction shall result in the imposition of sanctions in an amount to be
determined.
Except for the Rule 11 issue, Anderson's several Motions are without merit, and are
DENTED. The Modified Judgment is the entered this date. This signed Minute Entry shall be
the Order of the court, and no further Order is required unless counsel for Doms feels he needs
some additional formal order to ensure finality of at least this stage of the proceedings, in which
case he may submit an Order consistent with this Minute Entry.
DATED this 7th day of July, 200 L
By the Court:
^wlWMWIIf*,

—«</ r — /

^--aggi

$—*si

RoberrK. Hilder, District C|*ttfl[ •&&&NTy / ^ f
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gious to-permit the imposition of the death
penalty. See State v. ^Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232, 1248 (Utah 1993) ("we can confidently
say beyond a reasonable doubt that even if
the jury had not considered the invalid aggravator, it would have returned a.verdict of
death"), cert denied, 510 U.S.'979r 114 S.Ct.
476, 126 L.Ed^d 427 (1993).. .The trial court
found overwhelming aggravating .evidence
and rejected all of Lovell's mitigation theories. As,in Archuleta, leaving out, the "personal gain" aggravator would not have reduced Lovell's. sentence, so any error is
harmless.beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
1147 Because we find that all of Lovell's
claims fail, we affirm his conviction and sentence of death.
, X h i ^ Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART,
'justice'-|lMMERMAN,,and Justice
RUSSON concur in Associate Chief Justice
DURHAM'S opinion.-.

(O

f Kit NUMBER SYSTCM >

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
[14] fl 46 Lovell claims that his trial counsel performed ineffectively' because he did
not raise the constitutional challenges to the
specific aggravating circumstances that Lovell raises' oh 'appeal. •' In order to prove his
claim,' Lovelf-must' identify ^specific-acts or
.^missions by, counsel,which fell,below an
objective. standard of.{reasonableness, overcoming, the. presumption T>that counsel rendered T constitutionally. ..adequate.,, assistance.

uian

o^O

Cite as 984 P.2d 392 (UtahApp. 1999)

1999 UTApp 207

Ellen ANDERSON, as personal representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson;
Dan Scott; Ellen Anderson, personally;
and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, Appellees,
, and Cross appellants,
v.
Eugene £.-DOMS and Michael R. McCoy,
Defendants, Appellant, and Cross
appellee.

^ ^ m ^ ^ ^ C t . m Z r 80l.Ed.2d 674
No. 971762-CA.
.(1984).;., Furthermore, .under Strwjtfarid, Lovell rn;ust* ;also ^fGrmafi^y. prove.. that. the
Court of Appeals of Utah.
challenged acts_ or omissions, undermine .confidence in the outcome of his trial . See Id at
June 24, 1999.
694, 104'SiCt.'2052'." As" we have discussed,
Lovell's counsel had no basis on which to
challenge the constitutionality of the' death
Vendors^ brought' suit for foreclosure
penalty statute/including' the specific a'ggra- based on default on trust deed note given'to
vators.'^ The'Constitutionality .of thee- statute secure balance'owed otf purchase price. Purhas 'been' upheld'bythis':Court,"'sb'rcdunsel chaser cpunterciaimed for rescission or .damhad no .reasonxto >believe£h£ couldiinake . a ages (for'breachof implied covenants^ breach
legitimate - constitutional ^challenge. '.*' »(AsN we ofpjCoptxacij £ fraud,,' and r misrepresentation.
have noted,f'.the;'trialr-i2ourt-• could.and*did ToUowing 4l^nch.1 trial, Ihe District. Qourt deconsider < all -the evidence: in the. caseJ under nied request/or rescission, based upon Inches
the general sentencing1 provision;.without re- and J awarded i^urehaseri monetary • damages.
lying1 explicitly<on the specific aggravators as as iresult^'^eijciirabrances on propertjyi,!X,he.
aggravators. • challenged why > Lovell^•<Lovell Coinli T of^^ipeals-remiided ; for additional
fails' torestabHshTthat hisicounsel's "failure to -fmdingsf,on'flacnes.j On/rematid, the District
challenge^ the vstatutory |jrbvisions" fellUbelow <^^iBg^^^&^th&t
Caches: bari^nrescis-''
aiff//bbjective"^sHaiKlard^>Df ^reasonableness. *ion ; «id'rawardedi attorney 'fees' and J.cbsts.
?
iTfaerefore,«LoveD sielate does hot'dvercome Both (sidesV'afjpealed,; TTje. Court of Appeals,
^reetiwp^j};' $ M d ^ t h a ^ (1) 'vendors 'did • hot
iimned -kadficjuatSlyj^ lovell's ; constitutional suiTar requisite-prejudice to support laches
claims must fail; ^'••-o'" '.^ •: •..• -•;-!; •:•/!,^-^ bar to rescission claim} f (2) rescission was

appropriate remedy for vendors' breach of
covenant; (3) there was no statutory or contractual basis to support award of fees and
jcosts to purchaser; and (4) vendors were
.entitled, to fees incurred in securing default
judgment on foreclosure claim that was subsequently vacated.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., dissented.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>1008.1(8.1)
Although the determination of whether a
party was prejudiced for purposes of the
doctrine of laches is a legal conclusion that is
reviewed for correctness, trial court's findings of fact underlying that conclusion will
•not be set aside unless they are clearly erro•neous.
2. Appeal and Error <2>842(1)
,.. •. Whether attorney fees are recoverable is
a question of law which is reviewed for correctness,
3. Appeal and Error «=>1024.1
'"••-''; The sufficiency of a trial court's findings
•'supporting ah"award of attorney fees is're'viewed under a correctioh-of-error standard.

7. Vendor and Purchaser <s=119
Loss in value of property did not by
itself show that vendors were prejudiced by
purchaser's delay in bringing rescission action, so as to raise laches bar to rescission
claim.
8. Equity <3=>72(4)
. Increase or decrease in the value of
property alone does not satisfy the prejudice
prong of the laches defense.
9. Vendor and Purchaser 3=>ll9
Trial court's finding that it would be
inequitable to allow purchaser to rescind contract ^because he would benefit from his poor
decisions, was moral judgment, not fact finding, and did not support conclusion that vendors, were prejudiced by purchaser's delay in
seeking rescission of contract and that rescission was accordingly barred by laches.
10. Vendor and Purchaser <s>119

Purchaser's failure to make payments
under trustee deed note did not show that
vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's failure to perform, so as to impose laches bar
based on purchaser's delay in bringing rescission action, where any prejudice was pre4. Appeal and Error <8=*757(3)
Appellant was'relieved of his burden to cipitated by vendors' breach of covenant
marshal'evidence by reason of inadequacy of against encumbrances.
>
..trial, court's findings, which were unsupport- 11. Vendor and Purchaser <^ 119
Absent proof that vendors were prejue d in J record. or did : not support ultimate
diced by purchaser's several year delay in
conclusion on issue of laches.
bringing, action to rescind real estate pur5.. Vendor and Purchaser <£=>119
;
t. :. Purchaser's failure to. pay. taxes on prop- chase contract, laches did not bar relief;'
etfr^jpii^ resultog'^to^lBale^di^ noy prejudice
endor and P u r c h a s e r ^ l l Q, '
venoom so,as to support jaihes,bar. based on 12.;'vVenaor anu ruauuov. ,
^Rescission
of contract was proper rerae.pu^aja^s^de^
• rescission of
dyffor,
-vendor's
breach of covenant against
real ^estate contrac^ f ^ere^tax, .sale, was ; ulti.-.. ;;:-.;. , ; .:..
raately/ileclare'd" void and purchaser paid tax- encumbrances. .,
es and regafoed title to>roperty. ...
,13,'vVendor and Purchaser <$=>126, , . v....
fc'Upon' rescission of contract for vendor's
,6.,\Ven(frr^d*I^
\
*; ,\>©elay ir* seeking rescission of real estate breach of.warranty in case in which purchas^contaraWdid^noC^^
through er.'/' made . no significant improvements or
loss;,of ^toesse^ P5Vevidence, ,soyas ,to raise changes to real property, purchaser was enti...laches, b a r / f o ^ e g ^ f e ^ claim, • .despite, death tled to return of net payments made on trust
of one Vendor; ini^teriia, absent/proof that
deed note less rental value of property plus
vendors were deprived, to their prejudice, of
interest. •
any specific evidence or testimony.'

m
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14. Costs <S»i94.i6

.BACKGROUND' , f;,f6eS
nq<j
th*tt0niey
^ rec overable only • if -•••""•U2''In'',;Marchoi982;/ plaintiffs 'Dan''
£ « * a statutory or contractual b a S
J
;
awarding such fees.
"*sis ior Jeanne •. Scott,'• 'EUen^Anderson, '''and D:(3§
Anderson, ^£llen<; Anderson's1-now decease!
;
15, Covenants 3=132(2)
^?
husband, "sold a parceToT'property "known' af
Rossi Hilis[(the property)*in Park^ City; UtsM
Purchaser who was successful in o b £ to
Doms and Michael R'. McCoy>forJ'reside^
n
f
S T
° " ^ " ^ -^t'basea^n
tiai
^ develo^me^^Hrlnf-con^eption^^ t h | |
n t
agahst
w^ t t L T ; :
™brances '
sale,'
plaintiffs' executedJ a. r Warranty ,- Deed!
was not entitled to award of fees, as'there
that included a covenant' against encunv
S Z award for rescission
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remedy

and pu?-

i

ZZ
, £* ^ MaC°y r o u t e d a TVustl
Deed MdJTiustiOeed^ofe to secure
3

attempt to remove encumbrances.
16.

price, of SioiQ&n
, n •__> . vu-wic
, - , - .Huruidse,
_
.-.,...v
purcnase.;
price,;, of.^$1^,260,,,i Doraflj;#na\ McCoy- sjdapi
V
acquired an interest.in,a,parcel, adjoining,the|
Mortgages e=>580, 581(3) - ^ \ % property.;, kngwn i- A -fte-.^'slipper,pai:eeJ^
and Vendors
costs incurred
securing
default judgwere in
entitled
to attorney
fee's i M c C o y ^ n q ^ g ^
ment in foreclosure action .against purchase/
under trust deed'note, but'not to btner fees ; " : ; 113In Iate^9*84 a or J 'early ;,1985,: DomsV
incurred in litigation after default 'judgment '
was vacated, as'purchaser'ultimately pre*~,^ coocxnwits existed on the proper-,
vailed.
^ * $ ; ^
the*
"scliedule^pai®nS ori^',iie'viiropei^Tand", at- :
tempted to deeS the .property back "tc?$iainLarry R.' Keller,'. Keller & Lundgren' Lc, tiffs m T e t u r n ^ ^ j ( ^ c ^ ^ t 3 p n n c ^ ; . t h ^ 5 ^ t
Salt Lake City,; for Appellant- ' r"'" '''"''"" '
- I r v i n g ; H., Biele. and Curtis C. ^Nessett,
Nygaard,- Coke- & -Vincent,.Salt'Lake City, years later, plaintiffs "obtained a default judgfor Appellees.:;:. j " : V^f.:^, ..:.' • >> .•.;;?*;"» ment against Dom¥a3c?.M<i6o7^cauBg<the>y
datied.-tditile ^anrixiswe5;3n .response to '.plainBefore GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., and W p ^ o m f c l a i n ^ ^
BENCH and DAVIS/JJ?^ bur, voi.-<W/ .U default Jjudgmen§i)b«n^j51ed ran ^answer.Vand
tfounterdiu^t^
Approximately fouCTiontha; later; the. trial !court
OPINION;
. $ n t e r e d L W n P r § ^ B e t t ^ , ^ e . ^ e r default
JudgmenUgain^
GREENWOOD, M m - ^ ^ a i w M
..•HI Defendant Eugene t E . Doms appeals
for.the s e c o n d • M ^ ' W i i d W ^ H m P o t '
i

rz

Z£f Zi 'Z^Tc^up *;uiuiK on

««nnns-„Biien .'Anderson y'and:isDan-Vand
other^thlngg that the.doctrine oflwhes baw rSummit"'County-]
nonpaymenfiJofl

gvhich they had transferred ;their interest in
^the property. After Doms : paid all delin•quent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs,
rSummit County conveyed the property to
>Domcoy by quitclaim deed.-y/Dorncoy then
fconveyed.-the ^property to i Doms.3 J-In the
-meantime; plaintiffs had filed::another'action
'ichallenging the tax'sale and subsequent purchase of the property by Summit County,
seeking to quiet title to the property in their
favor. Upon stipulation of Summit County,
plaintiffs, and Doms, the trial, court set, aside
c
the tax sale.
..'.,. ;.','•• < '...'
.. -115 In early 1988, Doms amended his counterclaim, seeking rescission pf the contract
I or, in the. alternative, damages for breach of
implied, covenants, breach, ^contract,. fraud,
and-, misrepresentation. ^Jjijj}99pf .the r trial
was bifurcated and.a three day: trial was held
onithe issue. :p^." rescission.pf the .contract.
,Plainti28-argue4,r0nithe basiscof laches, ;that
Doms was .prohibited ;from.^rescinding. the
contract, because there was an unreasonable
delay between the time Doms learned of the
basis for.rescission,;and,.his.^attempt to rescind the• contract. , The trial.court subsequehtly ^issued f' a "Memoran'dum'. Decision,
finding -that because X)omsRuiireas6nably "delayed ^seeking rescission^ lacHesr barredT re'scissioWof^the'cbntracV^^fiHl^ :V. ! ^ i i :
'116 The^ remainder,of (i ^e:mal fo<iise^.on
the. issue of ^whether -Doms V a s ' entitled -to
damages.as }a rresiolt, of ^ e ^encumbrances, pn
. tie,^prppertyi 3,;;'lfie, .fi^ftjv cpurt :fi$o jield , a
,'hearing on. tHe^su'e. of .attorney'fees." r .In its
Second Amended;Findings of3Fact,and Conelusions of Lawland'Second ^Amended Judgm ^ n t U e ^ a l c i o u r ^ jt«Be
^-Beduppnfe^68?^
for ^rescission •* and
med Doms*s ^request •' fc

improperly applied the doctrine of laches to
bar rescission of the contract without first
entering findings of fact regarding whether
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay in
seeking rescission. See Anderson v, Doms,
No. 920653-CA, slip op. at 2-3 (Utah CtApp.
Nov. 4, 1994) (unpublished mem. decision).
Consequently, this' court remanded the case
to the trial court for further findings on the
issue of prejudice, stating, "If the trial court
cannot find from the evidence presented that
the [plaintiffs] were prejudiced by the delay,
tjie equitable doctrine of laches should not
bar the remedy of rescission." Id. On remand, the trial court again refused to rescind
the contract, concluding plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay in seeking rescission.
This appeal followed! "
' ;J'
'•' :
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF; REVIEW
[11 118 Donis argues he. is, entitled to
rescission because the'jtrial" court's' findings
on remand do'riot (support its conclusion that
plaintiffs twere.' prejudiced by his delay in
seeking rescission of the' contract/ See Bor^
1987). 'Wo J_suc^^rul]y .assert'{a 'laches• "'Hiefejise;va' [party], paust*.esSblisn..both tfiaj "the
[other.party).ui^easpnably.'delayed'in bringingj'toVactionrftio*.r^c^H the 'contractj^and
. that ;tt|e ^defendant^ 'was^prejudiced by, that
dela^.r' (atin^ JP(^ri^to'irp3. ? _"^nter. 1$.
Siydrhouse Sh^fypijlg Cir." Assoc?.', 63^ .P^d
' 1^66^1260 '(U£an 1975))). '"Although % e ^ e termination of whether a party was" prejudiced for purposes of the-doctrine of laches is
a legal conclusion that we review for correct'riess^'we 7will ''ti6tva,et'vaside?•S,Jff^al• court's

ffidingg

^m^m^^^^mmm

unless they are clearly errpneausr ^Se&SMKt*

suit of the". encumbrances' ojr r &e^property
!
^osts'.^TKe^ial court', also
arid:$101,50
^ atom* • .a.
.courtffi^ awardJCL .attorney-»fees / anxL costs.
WKisthe>T,att^rney*'fees;are°'r^^
a

e^urefs&iorjthe
't«Wi6^thafctiiiie,
te$C»ncoy,*a
^se^eBtiy'jissued -Mi jmpubJWied ^MeinpraD-

306,^-314 -(Utah 1998) :(citing Robertson v..
ftteiy^woVc^>fter:thc
he>learned:of t l l c -

3~.-Oa ren^d,;_thc trial ( ^ u r t r ; ^ ^ that the'con••' vcyance'tof the'propcrty ifroni^^^tuininit County to
Doms after.the tax sale resulted,in Dom5 holding
"clear title to the property.'j(^Therefore.;plain-

tiffs. argumenu premised on the contention that
•'. Doras 'did nor hold title to the entire parcel are
-•without merit. •'
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Gem Ins., 828-;PJ2d 496, 499 (Utah GtjVpp.
1992)). The sufficiency of a trial court's findings supporting an award of attorney fees is
also reviewed under a correction-of-error
standard. See id. Finally, although!, trial
courts 'are normally.;afforded .broad-discretion
in determining what constitutes treasonable
fee, see id., such, an-.award !:.V'must: berbased.
on the evidence and supported by findings.of
fact.'" Salmon v.+ Davis County, 916; P.2d
890, 893 (Utah..1996) (quoting Cottonwood
Mall Co. v. Sm;830,P.2d 266, 268.(Utah
1992)).

estiin-.the :slipper parcel and would likely
refuse to cooperate with plaintiffs in developing; the. adjoining property. However, plaintiffsjdo.jiot dispute that Doms's interest in
•thel supper, parcel, was; extinguished at a tax
sale^IBecause; this finding is inaccurate and.
iwitho'ut; record support, -it is clearly i erroneous Smd;has. no.,relevance to the issue.of
prejudice..::
B. 'Finding 10b 5
!

"'[5]' '1112 Finding 10b states that plaintiffs
were prejudiced as a result of Doms's failure
"to! pay- iaxes; on the property. ^However,'we
. ANALYSIS,"•
'cannot see' how failure to pay property taxes
' £".; Findings "of Fact .
prejudiced 'plaintiffs.•• Doms ultimately paid
[4] U 10 In challenging r$ie. trial gourds
<tJie^axes''andrTegaihed title to the property.
findings of fact, Doms argues-he should be 'Fur^erV'aiiparties stipulated that 'the -tax
relieved-of/(.his .burden- to; jnarshal-,thg'-.eyj-r feale'^was • void"'andrthat plaintiffs'; trust' deed
dence because of the inadequacy of the trial was^a"' Valid lien "on'the' property. 'Thus,
courts, findings. .See Woodward v. .Fazzio, yfihding'iOb does "not support the ;triat court's
823 P^d,^/47T : (Utali Ct^|^i991^jThere conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced by
is,' in' "effect,"n n'oJ t need ' for an; appellant !; to DomsVdelay/1''
marshal the evidence'when tAe^fmdings^are
U
so inadequate'that.they.cannot''Be^meaning'C; •'* Findings 10c 6; and ; l O d T
fully' cjialleriged as 7 factM^deten^
We 'agree, -'Because ffi^fihSui^ thorns chal- r j ^ f l . 1 3 . ^ d i i i ^ l O c and^lOd^both.state
lenges 'are eith^^t^uppofleol Jin'' the re'cora1 t&^jDoin^'s^^elay^.JL^ .seeking, rescission result^^,the'^u^ya^bOjty.pf witngss.es., ,/U.or dp h o t ' s u p p j ^
&ough it^is true that ^ne^arty^to^the^ngitiffs we^prejuo^^
for the,mbstLpar^'irre^eve]J *of' the fmatsTiaIin^
requirement.'.' •Ve^'er^orV address Dome's
specific'challenges1 ;to vih'^;1tfial' couVt's^findings of fact'.' " " " """ '*' ' ! ' ;
"&'" FindinglOa"*1
. 'Witt svriknnioMiL.,,,..
.,1.11 .Finding, 10a ''-provides that j
were pr^udicedtwcauserI)omfl,has an.

r forgotten
sate^f the property, these?findings do'not
denwnstrate that' plaintiffs1 were' 'deprived of
any*8pecinc *eviden6e or. testimony or how
Tackibf-that evidence would adversely affect;
plaintiffs, b e c a u s e Findings. 10c and lOd are
rconcluaory and do.tnot include any informa-

4,-.'Finding I Q a f * t i * i $ & & ^

-«y refltutee4 ^/pWntJfff. to ,Ini^iaje :legaU;action;to .

'Doms had the use,and,:bencfitqf tlie'pfb^ri.
ty 'to the exclusion, of the pla&fiff&i H f £ur^j
chased the slipper,parcel aniattempted^?, fa !&f
Wifote^ian*^
ed developme,nt1?,buC:-lwaifti ii ft^fssfuIhlThe r>
P ^ ^ / j ^ c ^ ^ l g r e ^ o f t ^ jfem^ggejofc.

' f"-.

•.. ..

Utah 397

ANDERSON v. DOMS
Cite as 984 P.2d 392 (UtahApp. 1999)

tion about testimony that plaintiffs'could not
elicit as a result of the delay, these findings
do not support the trial court's conclusion of
prejudice.
H 14 Finding lOd also states that plaintiffs
were prejudiced because Doms's delay prevented them from resolving the'Vencroachments on the property.;; '-However, plaintiffs
have not shown how Doms's delay ;made removing the encroachment^ :any more difficult
than it would have been'before the sale of
the property or in the. event plaintiffs reacquire the property. ' Thus; finding 18d does
not show that plaintiffs were prejudiced by
Doms's delay.

E.

Finding lOg

]

[9] 1116 Finding lOg states that it would
be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind the
contract because he "should not benefit from
his poor decisions." Because this statement
appears to be nothing more than a moral
judgment, unsupported by any evidence or
law, we cannot say that it supports the trial
court's conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced.
F.

Finding lOh

n

[10] 1117 Finding lOh, actually a legal
conclusion, states that Doms may not rescind
the contract because he was in default. We
,D. Rndipgs,10e;8 and10f,9,,
disagree. Although Doms failed to make
•in [7,8] % 15 FindingslOe and Nutate-that
payments required by the Trust Deed Note,
•plaintiffs were prejudiced because ;the prophe was excused from doing so as a result of
erty suffered a fifty percent decrease in valplaintiffs' breach of the.,covenant against en[ue ;during .the time..that -Doras possessed it.
cumbrances. See Holbrook v. Master ProtecThe first time this.case was appealed, we
tion Corp., 883 ?2d 295, 301 (Utah CtApp.
specifically rejected the ^argument that an
1994) ("The law is well settled that a material
increase or decrease in the value of property
breach by one party to a contract excuses
alone satisfies.'the;prejudice prong of the
further performance by the ..nonbreaching
.laches.defense.,:;]^ Qfyild v. Child, 8t\Jiah
party.") (citing Saunders v. Sharp,.840 P.2d
:
2d; 261, 271,,ml^2d.;98i, 988 .ftJtah 1958)
.796,-:806 (Utah CtApp.1992)); -Wright v.
-:(stating ^naUIral^cremen^^,iJ^ value of propWestside Nursery, :787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah
erty ,dpes notj standing, alone,, constitute prejCtApp.1990);. Bergstrom u Moore, 677 P.2d
udice for, purposes, of laches dcKjtrine);., see
1123,1125 (Utah: 1984) ("If it plainly appears
alsq^est Los> Angeles Instjfor' fiancer i?ethat a seller has lost or encumbered his
-aearchyy. Mayer, Mb .F^dl, 220, 228 (9th
ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill
Cir4966) (same)^ Ratherrja ^change in.prophis contract, he cannot insist that a buyer
ertyvjvalue is,.only one iactor a^pourt may
continue to make payments."). Any preju^cgnsic\er.,in <:determim^g>;^rejudice for the
dice that resulted'from Doms's failure'to
.purpose ;p.f: laches.;,•.. See Jbamon \y. Haynes,
make* payments pursuant to the Trust Deed
111^^26rf741^'7^4^aPth .Gif.1948);,.Filler v.
-Note was precipitated by plaintiffs' breach" of
. ^ M ^ ^ 7 ^ p n U ^ n 8 0 6 P.^d 537, .540
warranty. Because plaintiffs may not breach
(1991);' 'J4Wh8Q7)M Ja<^p80^,i67r?2d 156,
the .contract, and then claim they,, were preju>153 ( U ^ a ^ % ^ . T h e r e J f p r e ^
dice^ by. Doms's failure to perform, this.findl a d i n g t^afcl^g prpjp^gty^siifferedja decrease
,jngr does not support the trial ;court's; conclu(jn^aiueydoes:>nc& in afl4,pf itsel|f show.that
sion that plaintiffs were prejudiced. r <S[:) .-j,•; i
^ t o t i | ^ ^ r e ^ i ^ o ^ ^ y s D ^ n a . ' s delay.
^^ino^'oPfa^lOe's^f^^^
'time
.^Doins^f'l^Jmcoy^^teiprlswl^Inc. l<and Summit
^^C^unty y ^ ^ ^ S j e s ^ ^ f of;.the property, the

10. 'Finding of feet lOg states: ''Doras snould not
-'• benefit from his'poor'decision1'at the expense"of
I •) the plaintiffs; To allow that .to ^happen would.be

Doms has an „
with'the plairit£&;(in*an intpgr^tedj'de^ek^-; tirmp^g^i^,js:k'i6Xjy<Mtrs[ .befor^^j-sought;;to
ment is r e m p ^ p ,,t
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ; yresSJifed *hV transacSoir aidvers^lytajEfected.' the :
•ntplafefi^^pporti^^
5. '"Finding 1 Ob states: 5T.'D6ms f failed ";to pay?the ci
raerftan^ease^
property taxes for the years 1982^.1983^1984,. ,j-:.would-beMonavailable and memories are dimmed
1985 and 1986, which resulted in.a.tax sale and. -/;*by3if&rlapse of time.-'
* ''
'

-9,/oFinding.of fact JlQf,states; ilDouyb's] inexperijj^jpnce mJde,ye^pDJn|;(pr^perty> pr>(inaj)iiity .^o,seU
the 'property impacted the "plamtifisVJgreatIy' because of down turn in the real estat^e. market and
the increased costs to develop the property if
they chose to do so."
^

11. Finding'of fact 1 Oh states:4 "Boms was In
default; therefore, he could not invoke-the doctrine of rescission."
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